IRC operators :

There are also users whose privileges extend to whole servers or networks of servers; these are called IRC Operators. On some IRC implementations, IRC operators are also given channel operator status in every channel, although many people believe that administration of channels and administration of the network should be kept separate, and that IRC operator status does not confer the right to interfere with a particular channel's operation.

Attacks :

Because IRC connections are unencrypted and typically span long time periods, they are an attractive target for malicious hackers. Because of this, careful security policy is necessary to ensure that an IRC network is not susceptible to an attack such as an IRC takeover war. IRC networks also k-line or g-line users or networks that tend to have a harming effect.

IRC served as an early laboratory for many kinds of Internet attacks, such as using fake ICMP unreachable messages to break TCP-based IRC connections ("nuking") to annoy users or facilitate takeovers.
Abuse prevention: Timestamping vs. nick/channel delay protocol

One of the most contentious technical issues surrounding IRC implementations, which survives to this day, is the merit of "Nick/Channel Delay" vs. "TimeStamp" protocols. Both methods exist to solve the problem of denial-of-service attacks, but take very different approaches.

The problem with the original IRC protocol as implemented was that when two servers split and rejoined, the two sides of the network would simply merge their channels. If a user could join on a "split" server, where a channel which existed on the other side of the network was empty, and gain operator status, they would become a channel operator of the "combined" channel after the netsplit ended; if a user took a nickname which existed on the other side of the network, the server would kill both users when rejoining.

This was often abused to "mass-kill" all users on a channel, thus creating "opless" channels where no operators were present to deal with abuse. Apart from causing problems within IRC, this encouraged people to conduct denial of service attacks against IRC servers in order to cause netsplits, which they would then abuse.

Nick/channel delay

The nick/channel delay (abbreviated ND/CD) solution to this problem was very simple. After a user signed off and the nickname became available, or a channel ceased to exist because all its users left (as often happens during a netsplit), the server would not allow any user to use that nickname or join that channel, respectively, until a certain period of time (the delay) had passed. The idea behind this was that even if a netsplit occurred, it was useless to an abuser because they could not take the nickname or gain operator status on a channel, and thus no collision of a nickname or 'merging' of a channel could occur. To some extent, this inconvenienced legitimate users, who might be forced to briefly use a different name (appending an underscore was popular) after rejoining.